Michigan Law Review
Volume 53

Issue 8

1955

Conflict of Laws - Contracts - Enforcement of Foreign Contract
Though Contrary to State
William G. Cloon, Jr. S.Ed.
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Conflict of Laws Commons, Contracts Commons, Insurance Law Commons, and the
Jurisdiction Commons

Recommended Citation
William G. Cloon, Jr. S.Ed., Conflict of Laws - Contracts - Enforcement of Foreign Contract Though
Contrary to State, 53 MICH. L. REV. 1178 (1955).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol53/iss8/10

This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1178

MICHIGAN LAw R.Evmw

[ Vol. 53

RECENT DECISIONS
CONFLICT OF LAWS-CONTRACTS-ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN CONTRACT

THOUGH CONTRARY TO STATE PoLICY-Plaintiff, a citizen of Texas, obtained
from the defendant an insurance policy which was written and delivered in
Texas. The defendant agreed to pay for any damages to plaintiff's truck
caused by fire, but stipulated that any dispute over the amount of the loss
should he determined by arbitration proceedings in accordance with the terms
of the contract. The truck was damaged by fire in Arkansas and a dispute arose
over the amount of the loss. Plaintiff refused to submit the question to
arbitration and brought this suit in the Federal District Court for Arkansas.
Defendant argued that the action was premature since compliance with the
arbitration provision was a condition precedent to court action. Plaintiff did
not deny that the law of the place of making generally determines the validity
of contract provisions, or that the arbitration provision would have been valid
in Texas, but contended that since the public policy of Arkansas, as declared
by statute,1 opposed arbitration in insurance actions, the clause was unenforceable. Held, action dismissed. Since it did not appear that the Arkansas court
would have denied effect to an arbitration provision which is valid in the state
where the contract was made and delivered, the federal court sitting in that state
must enforce the provision. This rendered the action premature. Miller v. American Ins. Co. of Newarh, (D. C. Ark. 1954) 124 F. Supp. 160.
The general rule of conflict of laws is that a contract valid at the place of making or the place of performance will be enforceable in the state of the forum even
though such a contract would not be enforced by the courts of the forum had it
been made, or was performable, within the state.2 In insurance cases, the substantive law of the state where the policy was made and delivered will prevail over
the law of the forum. 3 The fact that the action is brought in federal court rather
than the court of the state should not change the end result. In diversity of citizenship cases, the federal court must apply the conflict of laws rules prevailing
in the state in which it sits. 4 Thus in the principal case the court properly
examined "the decisions of the Arkansas court to decide what rule would have
been appli~d had the case first arisen in that jurisdiction. 5 The general rule

1 The statute declares void those provisions which deprive the insured or beneficiary
of jury trial on questions of fact. Ark. Stat. (1947) §66-509.
2 GoonrucH, CoNFLICT oI' LAws, 3d ed., §§106, 107, 109, 110 (1949); STUMBBRG,
CoNFLICT OI' LAws, 2d ed., 226-241 (1951).
3 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Ruby, 219 Ark. 729, 244 S.W. (2d) 491 (1951). See
Faude, "Conllict of Laws Applied to Automobile Insurance,'' 1950 INs. L.J. 818.
4 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020 (1941);
Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 61 S.Ct. 1023 (1941). See Clark, "State Law in the
Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins,'' 55 YALE L.J. 267
(1946); Wolkin, "ConHict of Laws in the Federal Courts: The Erie Era," 94 UNIV. Pa.
L. RBv. 293 (1946).
5 The court first recognized that the provisions would have been void had the contract
been made in Arkansas, citing decisions of that state. But the court then looked to Ar-
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that the law of the situs of the transaction will be applied to the substantive
legal issues is subject to the exception that no right will be enforced which
would contravene the public policy of the state of the forum. 6 This exception itself is subject to qualification since constitutional objections may arise should the
forum capriciously apply its·own substantive law rather than the law of the situs
of the transaction. 7 Apart from the constitutional issues, the vagueness of the
term "public policy'-' presents a serious problem of definition. 8 In every action
in which the law of the forum differs from the law of the situs, the path is
open for the argument that the public policy of the forum opposes and prevents
the application of the foreign law. 9 The courts agree that a mere variance
between the laws of the two states should not prevent the enforcement of a
foreign law. 10 It has also been said that the courts should not refuse relief
unless the application of the law of the other state would "violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some
deep-rooted tradition of the common weal."11 Yet no rule of law has been
formulated by which the outcome of the public policy argument may be predicted.12 The more recent cases shed no further light on the uncertainty that
now exists.13 In deciding whether to refuse to apply the law of the situs for
kansas decisions on other foreign contracts held valid by the law of the place of making
though they would be void if made in Arkansas, and concluded by analogy that Arkansas
would have enforced the arbitration provision if faced with the problem of the principal
case.
6 See GoonroCII, CoNFLICT oF LAws, 3d ed., §§11, 106 (1949); STOMBERG, CoNFLICT OF LAws, 2d ed., 168-171, 278-279 (1951).
7 Denial of due process and full faith and credit have been argued in conflict of laws
cases. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 50 S.Ct. 338 (1930); Bradford Electric
Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 52 S.Ct. 571 (1932); Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143, 54 S.Ct. 634 (1934); John Hancock Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 57 S.Ct. 129 (1936); Order of United Commercial
Travelers of America v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 67 S.Ct. 1355 (1947).
s See Nutting, "Suggested Limitations of the Public Policy Doctrine," 19 MINN. L.
REv. 196 (1935). In 33 CoL. L. Rllv. 508 at 514 (1933), public policy is referred to as
an "amazingly shifty phenomenon."
o The situations in which the public policy argument can be made are uulimited.
For an excellent collection of the many types of cases in which it has been made, see 33
CoL. L. Rllv. 508 (1933).
10 First Nat. Bank v. Chuck Lowen, Inc., 128 Colo. 104, 261 P. (2d) 158 (1953);
Whitney v. Pemod, 149 Neb. 636, 32 N.W. (2d) 131 (1948); Warner v. Florida Bank
& Trust Co., (5th Cir. 1947) 160 F. (2d) 766; Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Cal. (2d) 108,
109 P. (2d) 701 (1941).
11 Judge Cardozo in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 224 N.Y. 99 at 111, 120
N.E. 198 (1918). The Restatement requires the contravention of a "strong" public
policy. CONFLICT OF LAws RllsTATllMENT §612 (1934). Some writers feel that local
public policy should be applied sparingly. See Beach, "Uniform Interstate Enforcement
of Vested Rights," 27 YALE L.J. 656 (1918); Goodrich, "Foreign Facts and Local Fancies,"
25 VA. L. Rllv. 26 (1938).
12 See note 8 supra.
13 Generally the courts pay lip service to the public policy limitations but give no
exacting explanation of why the foreign law may or may not be enforced because of local
policy. Among the cases finding local public policy supreme are Ciampittiello v. Campitello, 134 Conn. 51, 54 A. (2d) 669 (1947); Fahy v. Lloyd, (D.C. Mass. 1944) 57 F.
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policy reasons, the effect of the decision on the substantive rights of the parties
should receive consideration. If the refusal of the court to hear the case only
denies the plaintiff the use of the courts of the forum but does not deprive
him of the right to bring the action elsewhere, the use of the public policy
exception is more easily justified than if serious prejudice would result. Thus,
when the effect of the exception is to deprive the defendant of a substantive
<lefense so that affirmative enforcement is possible in the forum, the court
should not apply the public policy of the forum to the detriment of the party
who relies on the law of the situs of the transaction.14 In the principal case,
the court properly followed the Arkansas conflict of laws rules and applied
the law of Texas to the contract. The application of the Arkansas statute to
the insurance policy would allow the plaintiff to capitalize solely on his ability
to serve the defendant in Arkansas. It would be an unusual public policy
which would reward the plaintiff for the discovery of a jurisdiction in which
the defense of the insurance company is not recognized.

William G. Gloon, Jr., S.Ed.

Supp. 156; Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Stensland, 70 S.D. 103, 15 N.W. (2d) 8 (1944);,,, Liberthal v. Glen Falls Indemnity Co., 316 Mich. 37, 24 N.W. (2d) 547 (1946); Reed
v. Kelly, (7th Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 473; Transbel Inv. Co. v. Roth, (D.C. N.Y. 1940)
36 F. Supp. 396. illustrative of the cases applying the law of the situs despite local public
policy are American Furniture Mart Bldg. Corp. v. W. C. Redmon, Sons & Co., 210 Ind.
112, 1 N.E. (2d) 606 (1936); Eskovitz v. Berger, 276 Mich. 536, 268 N.W. 883 (1936);
Rauton v. Pullman Co., 183 S.C. 495, 191 S.E. 416 (1937); Rubin v. Schupp, (9th Cir.
1942) 127 F. (2d) 625; Tate v. Hain, 181 Va. 402, 25 S.E. (2d) 321 (1943).
14 The distinction between refusal to hear the case and affirmative enforcement of the
foreign action by application of local public policy is emphasized in Holderness v. Hamilton Fire Ins. Co., (D.C. Fla. 1944) 54 F. Supp. 145.

